Coup Belt

The Coup Belt (French: la ceinture de coups d'État) is a modern geopolitical concept and neologism which emerged during the 2020s to describe the region of West Africa, Central Africa and the Sahel that is home to countries with a high prevalence of coups d'état. After the 2023 Nigerien coup, these countries formed a continuous chain stretching between the east and west coasts of Africa.

Overview

Origin

Although likely older, the term became popular in the 2020s after a string of coups in the early part of the decade, including in Mali in 2020 and 2021, Chad, Guinea, and Sudan in 2021, two in Burkina Faso in January and September 2022, and in Niger and Gabon in 2023. The region also saw attempted coups in Niger and Sudan in 2021, Guinea–Bissau and The Gambia in 2022, and Sudan, Sierra Leone and Burkina Faso in 2023.

History

Since 1990, 21 of the 27 coups in sub-Saharan Africa have taken place in former French colonies. This has led some to question whether French influence in Africa has a destabilising impact.

The military juntas of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger cancelled military agreements that allowed for French troops to operate on their territory, and in the case of Mali, removed French as an official language.

ECOWAS has tried to actively work on changing this label that is associated with the region, although unsuccessfully; they suspended Mali after their coup in 2021, and also suspended Guinea on 8 September 2021, shortly after a military coup took place in the country.

Looking at the subregion of West Africa alone, it should also be noted that the 2020 coup d'état in Mali occurred after a period of nearly six years, since the 2014 Burkina Faso upprising and the ousting of Burkina Faso’s President Blaise Compaoré, during which there was not a single undemocratic change of government in West Africa. For this subregion, where many countries have a history of civil war and violent conflict, this was a period of remarkable stability, during which ECOWAS even managed to find a peaceful resolution to the 2016–2017 Gambian constitutional crisis.

The coups have largely been similar in nature; most came from dissatisfied militaries who criticised their respective government's handling of Islamic insurgents or protests since 2003. The incoming juntas also tend to have worse relations with the West, with many seeking support from either Russia and the Wagner Group or Turkey instead of France, who helped the countries fight against Islamic insurgents through Operation Barkhane.

The 2023 Gabonese coup d'état was somewhat different, as Gabon was ruled for 56 years by the Bongo family before the coup, is not near or part of the Sahel, and did not suffer from Islamist or separatist insurgencies. However, the military coup occurred in the context of widespread protests over the conduct of the 2023 Gabonese general election, and led to the establishment of a presidential republic under a military junta.

List of coups d'état in the Coup Belt

Notelist

References